Disability, gender, and the British labour market by Jones, Melanie
This is an Open Access document downloaded from ORCA, Cardiff University's institutional
repository: http://orca.cf.ac.uk/86655/
This is the author’s version of a work that was submitted to / accepted for publication.
Citation for final published version:
Jones, Melanie 2006. Disability, gender, and the British labour market. Oxford Economic Papers 58
(3) , pp. 407-449. 10.1093/oep/gpl004 file 
Publishers page: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oep/gpl004 <http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oep/gpl004>
Please note: 
Changes made as a result of publishing processes such as copy-editing, formatting and page
numbers may not be reflected in this version. For the definitive version of this publication, please
refer to the published source. You are advised to consult the publisher’s version if you wish to cite
this paper.
This version is being made available in accordance with publisher policies. See 
http://orca.cf.ac.uk/policies.html for usage policies. Copyright and moral rights for publications
made available in ORCA are retained by the copyright holders.
 1 
Disability, gender and the British labour market 
 
Melanie K. Jones†, Paul L. Latreille† and Peter J. Sloane†‡ 
†WELMERC, Department of Economics, University of Wales Swansea 
‡








Using UK LFS data, we examine the impact of disability on labour market outcomes by gender 
since the Disability Discrimination Act. Substantial differences in employment incidence and 
earnings continue to exist, especially for those with mental health problems. Distinguishing 
between work-limiting and non-work-limiting disability, the unobserved productivity effect of 
disability can be separated from discrimination.  Limited evidence of wage discrimination 
against the disabled exists, but the ‘penalty’ for work-limiting disability, while falling for men, 
has increased for women. The improvement for disabled males is largely ‘unexplained’, possibly 
reflecting the impact of the legislation; this is not the case for females. 
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The economic analysis of disabled workers within the labour market has been relatively 
neglected in the UK, especially given the numerical size of this group.1 Using the 2001 Labour 
Force Survey (LFS) Smith and Twomey (2002) note that nearly one in five people of working 
age had a current long term disability in the UK; this amounts to some 3.7 million men and 3.4 
million women. As the European Foundation (2003) notes, although cultural factors may operate 
both across and within countries to influence the incidence of reported disability, only Finland 
has a higher percentage of the working age population (defined as aged 16-64 years according to 
the European Community Household Panel (ECHP)) reporting chronic illness or disability than 
the UK.2 The contrast in labour market outcomes for disabled and non-disabled persons in the 
UK is stark: the employment rate for the disabled is just 48%, compared to a rate of 81% for the 
non-disabled, while for those disabled people in employment, average earnings are substantially 
lower than for their non-disabled counterparts.  
The above figures are especially striking when considered in the context of legislative 
and other reforms over the last few years aimed at securing improvements in the labour market 
position of disabled individuals. The major legal change in this regard was the passing of the 
Disability Discrimination Act (DDA) in 1995, which was designed to protect the disabled against 
discrimination and to facilitate and enhance their access to employment by imposing obligations 
on employers (with 15 or more employees) to make reasonable adjustment to their premises 
and/or employment arrangements.3 In addition, a Disability Rights Commission provides advice 
                                                 
1
 This contrasts sharply with the US where there has been a substantial increase in publication on such issues 
following the passing of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) in 1990. 
2
 Within the UK the average rate was 18.8% in 2000, but this varied between 15.8% in the South East and 23.9% in 
the North East. The differential between regional rates is relatively higher among older persons. 
3
 The 1997 Treaty of Amsterdam extended the coverage of Community Law to cover, inter alia, disabilities, and an 
EU directive of November 2000 prohibits any direct or indirect discrimination based on disability with respect to 
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and information, supports disabled persons in securing their rights under the DDA, and 
campaigns on behalf of this group. The Government has also improved incentives to work via 
the tax and benefit system and more particularly through the Disabled Person’s Tax Credit, while 
the New Deal for Disabled People (NDPP) introduced in July 2001 further attempts to help those 
out of employment to get back into work. This last policy measure is a voluntary programme 
whereby disabled people have access to a network of Job Brokers whose role is essentially to 
provide advice about the local labour market and to support individuals in finding and retaining 
work.4 
A key issue for policymakers is to determine the extent to which such reforms have 
achieved their objectives. However, estimation of the impact of legislation and other policy 
measures in this area is hazardous for a number of reasons. In this regard work in the US is more 
advanced, and a number of studies has attempted to estimate the employment effects of the 
Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA). Thus, DeLeire (2000) found that on average over the 
post ADA period, employment of men with disabilities was 7.2% lower than before the Act was 
passed. Similar results were obtained by Acemoglu and Angrist (2001), who point out that 
although the number of disability transfer payments went up, this cannot on its own explain the 
decline in employment. Consistent with ADA being the explanation, the impact was greater in 
                                                                                                                                                             
employment and occupation. This required the UK to extend the coverage of the DDA to cover all employers, 
including those employing fourteen or fewer workers, as from October, 2004. 
4
 Britain had had some form of means tested benefit for adults with children on low earnings who worked more than 
a certain number of hours per week since 1971.  In October 1999 a more generous tax credit was introduced.  
However, at the same time out of work benefits for families with one or more children aged under 11 were 
introduced, so that the overall impact on labour force participation was unclear.  Leigh (2004) reports that the reform 
also reduced the fraction of people who said they had a serious health problem or that a health problem prevented 
them from working by about 1%, and for all affected groups, raised relative employment rates by 1%.  Hours and 
relative earnings also increased.  The Disabled Persons tax credit, also means tested,  required that disabled people 
were in receipt of various types of disability benefit in the previous 26 weeks to qualify and working 16 hours or 
more a week.  Together with the New Deal for Disabled People, this should have increased the willingness to seek 
work by increasing the total benefits from working and reducing reservation wages.  The complexity of these 
arrangements means, however, that it is not feasible to attempt to identify their effects in this study, save to say that 
they may to some degree have offset any negative effects of the DDA as outlined in the US literature. 
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larger firms (smaller firms being exempt) and in States with more ADA-related discrimination 
charges. The implication of these results is that the legislation reduced the demand for disabled 
workers by raising the costs of employing such workers by more than the increase in demand 
brought about by any reduction in discrimination. However, these results have been questioned 
on the grounds that the work disability measure used may not accurately reflect coverage under 
the ADA. Legislation may, by removing the stigma of disability, encourage more individuals to 
report a disability. Further, some who previously reported a disability prior to the legislation may 
not do so subsequent to its introduction if improvements to the workplace mean they are no 
longer limited in their work. As Kruse and Schur (2003) conclude, the analysis of the 
employment effects of disability legislation is confounded by changes in the composition of 
those reporting disabilities, the role of disability income and the relative effects of business 
cycles on workers with and without disabilities. Thus, Beegle and Stock (2003) make use of the 
fact that disability discrimination laws vary widely across States with respect to their coverage of 
physical and mental disabilities to use an experimental framework that generates treatment and 
comparison groups. While they find negative effects of the laws on the relative earnings of the 
disabled, once they have controlled for pre-existing employment trends among the disabled and 
non-disabled, there is no such effect on relative employment rates of the disabled. Similarly, 
Hotchkiss (2004) notes that previous studies have failed to control for selection into the labour 
market. When this first stage selection process is controlled for, the predicted unconditional 
employment probability for a disabled person has actually increased since the ADA legislation. 
Further, there is evidence that non-participant welfare recipients have changed their 
identification in order to move off welfare payments and into disability programmes. She 
suggests that condemnation of ADA should focus on the possibility that by lowering wages of 
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the disabled, it has caused some of them to drop out of the labour market, a feature which is 
examined for Britain in this paper. 
A further complicating factor, which has received growing attention in the literature is 
‘justification bias’ or the endogeneity of self-assessed health measures. In particular, disability 
may be a socially acceptable and convenient rationalisation of absence from the labour market. 
However, most studies focus on self-reported health status rather than objective measures of 
disability, and there is a suggestion that self-reported records of specific illnesses may be less 
prone to this form of bias, though this has been questioned by Baker et al. (2004). The empirical 
evidence on justification bias is mixed. Kreider (1999) suggested that over-reporting of health 
related work limitations was particularly prevalent among non-working women, high school 
drop-outs, non-whites and former blue-collar workers in the USA. Such biases will lead to over-
estimates of the effects of limitations on non-work activity and under-estimates of the effect of 
income on such activity. Kreider and Pepper (2002), using data from the Health and Retirement 
Study, confirmed the fact that models estimated on the assumption of fully accurate reporting led 
to biased inferences with non-workers tending to over-report disabilities. Yet Campolieti (2002), 
using information on specific health conditions as instruments on Canadian data found that self-
reported measures tended to under-estimate the effect of disability status on labour force 
decisions and Benitez-Silva et al. (2003) using the same Health and Retirement Study, but 
examining a sub-sample of disability applicants, found that such individuals did not on average 
exaggerate their disability status. Finally, Au et al. (2004), again using Canadian data, found 
some evidence of justification bias when using self-assessed health, but these provided similar 
estimates of employment effects as objective measures or a ‘purged’ health measure. Given the 
absence of fully objective measures in the LFS, our approach to this problem is two-fold. First, 
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we model employment and earnings separately for men and women, with the likelihood that 
misreporting may affect both groups equally, and second, we also model the effects of particular 
types of disability on employment and earnings.  These specific health measures, while also self-
reported, as noted above, are perhaps likely to be less severely contaminated by such biases. 
In the UK, no comparable studies exist that attempt to examine the impact of the DDA. 
Indeed, to our knowledge there are very few extant economic studies of the labour market 
outcomes of the disabled. Blackaby et al. (1999) is a comprehensive report prepared for the then 
Department for Education and Employment (DfEE) using data from the 1991 Census, 1992-4 
Quarterly LFS data and the General Household Survey (GHS). Irrespective of data source, the 
findings indicate that the unemployment probabilities of the disabled/those with long-term health 
problems are higher than for the non-disabled/those without long-term health problems, while 
their earnings are lower. Differences in characteristics (productivity) account for a maximum of 
around half of the differences, the employment differential being perceived as the more 
substantial (confirming the figures above). 
The only UK study published in an economics journal to date however, is that by Kidd et 
al. (2000) which uses data from the 1996 LFS, but restricts the analysis to males only.5 These 
authors again find that human capital/productivity characteristics differences between the 
disabled and non-disabled explain around 50% of the wage and participation rate differentials 
between the two groups. They therefore conclude that, notwithstanding difficulties in 
interpretation, the size of the residual or unexplained element of the difference (in wages) 
suggests that it ‘may, in part, be addressed by the implementation of the 1995 Disability Act’ 
(2000: 979). 
                                                 
5
 Contoyannis and Rice (2001) do however examine the related issue of health on earnings for both men and 
women. 
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The present paper in part adopts the approach in Kidd et al., but using more recent data 
from the LFS, and with a number of important additions/differences. These novel features are set 
out in more detail below, but primarily include examining the effects by gender, superior 
handling of potential unobserved productivity differences between the disabled and non-disabled 
(and hence of any discriminatory behaviour by employers), and estimation at two points in time 
so as to explore the efficacy of the DDA.  
 
1.1 Gender 
A particular focus in this paper is on gender differences in disability effects in the labour market. 
Since the relative position of women in the labour market in general is inferior to that of men, at 
least in terms of earnings, it is clearly of interest to ascertain whether disabled women are 
similarly disadvantaged relative to disabled men.6 It should be noted, for instance, that long-term 
illness affects manual workers disproportionately and men are heavily concentrated in these jobs 
relative to women, though it does not necessarily follow that disability has a greater impact on 
men than on women. Further, comparing men and women overcomes many of the difficulties 
outlined above. The disability rates for men and women of working age are very similar and 
there is no clear evidence of differential reporting bias according to gender. Given that the results 
in Kidd et al. (2000) were restricted to males only, we believe extending the analysis to consider 
both sexes constitutes an important and original contribution to the UK literature, although such 
an analysis has been undertaken for the US (see Baldwin and Johnson, 1995). 
 
                                                 
6
 Haveman et al. (2000) find that disabled men fare somewhat better than disabled women when comparing the size 
of family income. Stapleton and Burkhauser (2003) using the US Current Population Survey found that mean 
household income of working-age men without disabilities increased by 12.6% between 1989, a peak year in the 
1980s business cycle, and 2000, a peak year in the 1990s business cycle, compared to a fall of 2.9% over the same 
period for men with disabilities. The corresponding figures for women increased by 12.6% and 5.6% respectively. 
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1.2 Productivity and discrimination 
A second departure from Kidd et al., who assume there are no unobserved differences in 
productivity between the disabled and non-disabled is our use of an approach previously adopted 
by DeLeire (2001) on the US Survey of Income and Program Participation over the period 1984-
93. He argues that the change in the unexplained component of the wage decomposition between 
these two dates should say something about how discrimination has changed over the period. 
Further, the sample is split into three groups – the non-disabled, the disabled who report that 
their productivity at work is unaffected by their disability, and the disabled who report that their 
disability is work-limiting (i.e. affects the type and amount of work that the individual can do).7 
Assuming that those who report no work limitations do not have lower productivity as a result of 
their health impairment relative to the non-disabled, we can interpret the unexplained residual in 
a Oaxaca-type decomposition in their case as an estimate of discrimination. Further, if the degree 
of discrimination is assumed to be the same for both groups of the disabled, the unexplained 
residual of the work-limited group of disabled (less the measure of discrimination for the non-
work-limited disabled group) may be considered an estimate of the lower productivity of the 
work-limited disabled relative to the non-disabled that is not captured by the measured 
characteristics included in the empirical model. In DeLeire’s case, using this procedure, only 3.7 
percentage points of the earnings gap in 1984 was found to be the result of discrimination and 
the amount of discrimination did not change significantly between 1984 and 1993. However, the 
negative effects of poor health on the earnings of the disabled fell substantially, possibly because 
                                                 
7
 There are certain differences in the types of disability which affect the two disabled groups. In 1997 (2003), 
44.27% (38.90%) of those with work limiting disabilities report main health problems relating to arms, hands, legs 
or feet, or back or neck compared to only 21.38% (18.88%) for the non-work limited disabled, while only 21.78% 
(18.84%) of those a work limiting disability reported chest, breathing problems or heart, blood pressure, circulation 
problems compared to 39.85% (41.58%) in the case of the non-work limited disabled. The second group of 
disability types may be less visible to the employer without the use of medical tests (on the incidence of which we 
have no information); there is little difference in the percentages affected by more visible forms of disability among 
the two disabled groups. 
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of the positive effects of disability legislation in requiring employers to provide reasonable 
accommodation for disabled employees. 
 
1.3 Post-DDA impact over time 
The third major difference between the present paper and Kidd et al. exploits the availability of 
more recent data to consider the impact of the DDA.  It should however, be noted that a formal 
evaluation of the impact of the DDA using the results of Kidd et al. as a base or benchmark 
against which to gauge progress is problematic. This is in part due to the fact that similar 
problems apply to those experienced by US researchers examining the ADA. However, these 
difficulties are compounded in the UK context by a change in disability questions in the LFS. 
More specifically, until the Winter of 1996 individuals were asked: 
(i) if they had health problems which would affect any kind of paid work they might do; 
and 
(ii) if the health problem would be expected to last more than a year. 
From Spring 1997, the order in which these questions were asked was reversed, and an 
additional question was asked about the amount of paid work the disabled can do. As Cousins et 
al. (1998) note, this simple change identified 24% fewer respondents in the UK reporting a long-
term disability which affected the kind of work they might do, and of those it did identify, a 
greater proportion were economically inactive.8 This makes any attempt to estimate the 
                                                 
8
 In the Winter of 1996 15,150 (16.93% of the sample) said they had health problems that affected the kind of paid 
work they might do.  This is a smaller number than those who answered the initial question in Spring 1997, namely 
that they had a health problem lasting more than one year, which numbered 15,947 (or 18.97% of the sample).  In 
1996, 902 (6.03% of the sample) answering the question on health problems lasting more than one year (yes/no) had 
a health problem lasting less than one year, and these would not be included from 1997.  However, from 1997 the 
change in the order of questions means that we can identify those disabled who were not affected by the amount of 
work they could do, though they were affected by the nature of work. These amount to 1,950 (or 18.3% of those 
whose health problem affected the kind of work they could do) who previously could not have been counted as 
work-limited disabled. 
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employment effects of the DDA on the basis of a before and after study using the LFS 
hazardous.9  
In our case we make use of the above distinction between work-limiting and non-work-
limiting disability using the LFS between Spring 1997 and Winter 2003/4 – a period of over six 
years. Fortuitously, the start period is only a few months after the 1995 Disability Discrimination 
Act came into operation (on the 2nd December 1996). We are unable to adopt a before and after 
approach due to the data limitations previously discussed, so that any immediate impact of the 
legislation may be missed. However, as Hotchkiss (2004) notes, the question of when the 
legislation will have its strongest impact is debatable. She defines the post-legislation period as 
the first full year of implementation of ADA rather than the date of its enactment and we adopt a 
similar approach here, comparing two points of time in the post-DDA period, it being unlikely 
that the full effects of the legislation would be identified prior to this. 
A final feature of the paper that should be noted at the outset is that while most studies of 
discrimination focus on between-group differences in economic outcomes, we also identify 
within-group differences. Disability varies both in type and intensity, leading to the possibility of 
omitted variable bias when differences in functional capabilities are excluded. The problem is 
that it is generally not possible to incorporate these into the analysis of between group 
differences, since the non-disabled, by definition, do not possess such disabilities. However, we 
can compare the case of disabled men and women, including functional limitations in both 
equations (see Salkever and Domino, 2000).10 To anticipate our results somewhat, it is clear that 
                                                 
9
 Seasonal differences in the LFS mean that it is not appropriate to limit the analysis to a single quarter. The LFS 
recorded 16% more disabled in Winter 1997 than in Spring 1997. Hence the ONS suggests data for Summer, 
Autumn and Winter are more reliable and imply a decline of only 10% in the number of disabled compared to the 
results from the earlier question format. 
10
 However, their results were rather mixed. Their employment probit results suggest that persons with severe 
disabilities are more likely to be employed, rather than less, although their wage regressions suggest that those with 
severe disabilities do earn less. 
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significant differences do exist between types of disability. This is most notable for individuals 
with mental health problems, whose labour market position appears especially adversely 
affected. This has potentially important implications for the design of policy, which has hitherto 
largely focused on physical impairment and adaptation. 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. In Section 2 we set out the empirical 
methodology employed, followed in Section 3 by a brief description of the data. Results appear 
in Section 4, together with a discussion of the implications deriving from these, while 
conclusions follow in Section 5. 
 
2. Methodology. 
The standard labour economics model assumes that individuals select that combination of 
consumption and hours of work which maximises their utility, subject to budget and time 
constraints. Health may be incorporated into the standard model, either through the budget 
constraint (via a lower wage offer), the time constraint (via more absences lowering time 
available for work) or through the utility function itself if poor health reduces utility (see Ettner, 
2000). 
We follow the traditional labour force participation model in assuming that an individual 
decides upon whether or not to enter the labour market on the basis of a comparison between the 
employer’s wage offer and his or her reservation wage. Low employment rates11 could be due in 
part to high reservation wages associated with certain types of disability as a consequence of 
disability income transfers and the extra demands on time and energy required to participate in 
                                                 
11
 It should be noted that our definition of participation in the empirical section is based on the observation of a 
positive wage for a particular individual, and therefore strictly speaking relates to employment. This clearly 
understates the true level of participation to the extent that it treats the unemployed as non-participants and excludes 
those in employment with missing wage data (see below). 
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the labour force. Low employment rates might also be due to low market wage rates offered to 
the disabled as a consequence of lower levels of productivity and/or employer discrimination 
(Kruse and Schur, 2003). 
There are three types of individual for each gender (results are estimated separately for 
men and women; a distinction which is suppressed in the notation for simplicity).  The disabled 
are represented by D1 (work-limited) and D2 (non-work-limited) and the non-disabled by N, 
giving six groups in total. For each of these types the wage offer equation is given by: 
 1 2( , , )Oij j ij ijW X v j D D N    (1) 
where OijW  denotes the logarithm of the (offer) wage, ijX  is a vector of productivity related 
characteristics for individual i of type j and j  the associated rates of return, making the normal 
assumptions of the human capital model. The reservation wage is given by: 
 1 2( , , )Rij j ij ijW Z j D D N      (2) 
where the vector Z incorporates the conventional human capital variables, with the addition of 
factors influencing the value of time (such as the number of dependent children). We do not 
directly observe the reservation wage, which is a latent variable, but rather the indicator variable 
I, where I = 1 if Rij
O
ij WW  and 0 otherwise. Thus, the probability that an individual works is: 
    jijiijjijjrrijOijr vZXPWWP  0   (3) 
Assuming that ijv  and ji  are normally distributed, the labour force participation (employment) 
equation may be estimated by a probit specification. 
In estimating the wage equation (1), it is important to correct for sample selection, given 
that the disabled in particular are unlikely to be a random sub-set of the population as a whole. 
Indeed, if wage discrimination against disabled workers is substantial and leads to those subject 
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to significant discrimination exiting from the labour force, the estimate of true wage 
discrimination would be below its true level. Thus, we utilise a Heckman two-stage procedure in 
which the probit estimates are used to derive the inverse Mills ratio, which is used as an 
additional regressor in the wage equation. 
In estimating the size of the discriminatory wage differential which may exist between 
disabled and non-disabled employees, we follow earlier studies by Lambrinos (1981) and 
Baldwin and Johnson (1994, 2000), based on a technique developed by Reimers (1983). The 
difference in wage offers between non-disabled (N) and disabled (D) employees can be 
decomposed as: 
)()( DNDDNNDN XXccWW     DN ˆ)1(ˆ    
   )ˆˆ(X)1(X DNDN                  (D=D1 or D2) (4) 
The left-hand side of equation (4) then represents the difference in mean wage offers between 
non-disabled and disabled employees. The first term on the right-hand side represents that part of 
the difference in wage offers which is attributable to differences in productivity, while the 
second term represents that part of the wage difference which is unexplained. The latter is 
conventionally interpreted as discrimination, but here we distinguish between non-work limited 
and work-limited disabled to control for unobserved productivity differences, as well as 
including types of disability to capture specific health problem effects. A matrix   represents 
the relationship between the observed wage structure and the non-discriminatory norm. Its 
diagonal elements take values ranging from zero to one depending on which group is the frame 
of reference given the typical index number problem (see Oaxaca and Ransom, 1994). We 
provide results using the disabled as the base (0), the non-disabled (1), taking the mean of these 
two results (0.5) (Reimers, 1983), taking ratios given by the shares of the non-disabled and 
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disabled in the working population (Cotton, 1988), and finally the figure obtained from a pooled 
regression (*) (Neumark, 1988). In addition, we report decompositions between men and women 
for each of the three disability categories using an analogous method. 
Further, given that we estimate our wage equations at two points in time, we also perform 
time-wise decompositions for each of our six groups, so as to examine the contributions of 
(changes in) characteristics and coefficients to wage offer growth for each group over the period 
1997 to 2003, i.e. 
)XX()cc(WW 19972003199719972003200319972003     19972003 ˆ)1(ˆ    
   )ˆˆ(X)1(X 1997200319972003    (5) 
Finally, it has been argued that health and employment may be endogenous. Thus, in the 
case of mental health disability, employment may have a positive effect by increasing 
opportunities for social networking and role satisfaction, but also a negative effect if it increases 
occupational stress. In the case of physical health, positive effects may arise from the ability of 
higher income from work to be invested in health improvements, but negative effects from 
occupational hazards or stress from work overload. In such cases health may be correlated, either 
positively or negatively with the error term in the participation equations. Such evidence has 
been found by Ettner (2000) using 1993 US data. Two-thirds of her sample reported either 
positive or negative effects (more cases being positive than negative). However, using a two-step 
instrumental variable approach she finds that the effects of health on labour market outcomes are 
not particularly sensitive to reverse causality. For this reason, and because of the difficulty of 
finding appropriate instruments in our data set, no attempt is made here to deal with potential 




We utilise individuals in waves 1 or 5 from each of the four quarters of the LFS in 1997 and 
2003, so as to exclude repeated observations on the same individual (by design individuals 
remain in the survey for five consecutive quarters). The work-limited disabled are defined as 
individuals who have a self-reported long-term illness (12 months or more) which limits the type 
or amount of work they can do, the remaining disabled being defined as non-work-limited and all 
other individuals classified as non-disabled. As noted earlier, labour market activity equals one if 
the individual is an employee with a positive wage, and otherwise is zero.12  
As Baldwin and Johnson note, in theory all variables in the wage equation should also be 
included in the employment equation, but clearly some of these variables will not be observed 
for those not in employment. This could adversely influence the correction for selectivity bias in 
our equation. Identification is obtained by including a variable for the number of children in the 
household in the employment equation if the respondent is the head of household or their spouse 
(zero otherwise). In addition to this, we also incorporate a dummy indicating the presence of a 
labour market income earner in the household in the participation equation. Finally, we use 
experience and its square in the wage equation, but linear and quadratic terms in age in the 
employment equation. Qualifications dummies and regional dummies, together with ethnic 
origin, type of household tenure and number of health problems appear in both employment and 
wage equations. The latter also includes occupational and industry dummies, the number of days 
off sick in the reference week, a small establishment dummy, a public sector dummy, a part-time 
dummy and tenure variables. The hourly pay variable is based on usual weekly pay divided by 
usual hours, with a dummy variable included also for the amount of usual overtime. In addition 
                                                 
12
 Individuals who are self-employed, on a government training scheme, or who have missing information with 
regard to their hourly wage or other key variables are excluded from the estimation sample. 
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to separate estimation by reported disability status, all these equations are estimated separately 
for men and women, thereby allowing for the possibility that some of the independent variables 
may have gender-specific effects. 
In addition, we estimate employment and wage equations for the disabled only 
augmented by five health type dummies derived from the 17 main health problems identified in 
the LFS. It was necessary to merge some of these for estimation purposes because of problems of 
small cell sizes. It should be noted that in 2003, only just under a quarter of those reporting a 
health problem claim sickness or disability benefit,13 but this figure is higher for men (26%) than 
for women (21%).14 There is also substantial variation in the percentage of those with different 
types of health problem claiming sickness/disability benefits, ranging from 3.2% in the case of 
skin conditions/allergies to 62.1% in the case of mental illness/phobia. Similar variability occurs 
in relation to ILO unemployment (defined according to the International Labour Office as those 
actively seeking work in the previous four weeks) and inactivity by reported health problem (cf. 
disability). The former ranges from 1.3% in the case of ‘other’ progressive illness to 8.7% in the 
case of learning difficulties and the latter from 20.1% in the case of skin conditions/allergies to 
80.1% in the case of mental illness/phobia. Therefore there is a very wide variation in the extent 
to which various types of health problem hamper job prospects, with mental illness having the 
most severe effects. This last statistic confirms the particular difficulties faced by persons with 
mental illness identified in previous research (see Meager et al., 1998; Bunt et al., 2001). 
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 These data are based on the estimation sample augmented by those in employment with missing wage information 
(whose exclusion would otherwise inflate the reported figures). 
14
 The corresponding figures for disabled persons are 44%, 49% and 39% for all, males and females respectively. 
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4. Results. 
As shown in Fig. 1, the percentage recorded as non-disabled in the LFS over the period 1997-
2004 has fallen by 6 or 7 percentage points from a starting value of around 80% for both men 
and women. The incidence of work-limiting disability has increased only marginally over the 
period, with the percentages for men and women again being relatively close. Significantly, 
however, the number of persons reporting themselves as non-work-limited disabled grew 
substantially between the two dates, from around 7% to nearly 12% for both men and women, 
which is perhaps indicative of the liberating impact of the legislation in terms of reporting 
disability for this group. It should be noted that our sample of the latter in absolute terms is much 
larger than in the DeLeire study for the US.   
<Fig. 1 about here> 
In terms of employment rates, this was 26.69% (30.96%) for work-limited disabled men 
in 1997 (2003), compared to 79.41% (78.34%) for non-disabled men. The non-work-limited 
disabled men’s employment rate in 1997 (2003) was 81.24% (80.66%). For women the 
corresponding figures for work-limited disabled were 27.43% (31.22%) and for non-work 
limited disabled 72.36% (70.90%) respectively, compared to 67.88% (68.52%) for non-disabled 
women. Thus, for both men and women, employment rates for the work-limited disabled have 
improved relative to those of the other two groups, which is an indication of a possible, positive 
effect from the DDA.  
Turning next to wages, in 1997 the hourly earnings of those whose disability was work-
limiting were 86.1% of those of the non-disabled, whereas earnings for the non-work-limited 
disabled were 100.65% of those of the non-disabled. By 2003 these figures were 86.0% and 
98.2% respectively (the time profile of earnings for each of the groups is presented in Fig. 2). 
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There is no prima facie evidence therefore, at least on the basis of these data, that the relative 
position of the disabled has changed over the six years since the introduction of the DDA. 
<Fig. 2 about here> 
The means of the variables used in the regression analysis are presented in Table 1, and 
several important differences among the sub-groups are worthy of note. In large part these 
conform to expectations. Thus, for both men and women, disabled persons, particularly those 
who are work-limited, are on average, less well qualified than their non-disabled counterparts, 
with the disparity being most acute for those with the higher qualifications such as degrees. 
Disabled persons are also typically older (reflecting the fact that many disabilities exhibit age-
related onset), and for this reason, also more likely to own their own home; they are also 
however, more likely to be in public housing. Both male and female disabled groups are also, on 
average, less likely to be in a household where another individual has a source of earned income 
(for a discussion of which, see below), suggesting that they cannot rely on this as a means to 
ameliorate their own disadvantage in the labour market. In every case the differences are more 
marked between the work-limited disabled and the non-disabled (cf. the non-work-limited 
disabled). 
For those who are in employment, there are also substantial differences between the 
work-limited disabled and the non-disabled, and also between males and females. These 
differences are most marked in the proportions working in certain occupational groups, the 
public sector and small firms. Men typically work more overtime hours than women, and the 
non-disabled more than the disabled; this is inversely correlated with the proportions working 
part-time, as would be expected. Finally, it is especially interesting to note that disabled males 
and females have longer average tenure than their corresponding non-disabled comparator group. 
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4.1 Employment participation 
The employment participation probit estimates are presented in Table 2 for men and Table 3 for 
women respectively. As can be seen, for the sake of parsimony, we report a full set of coefficient 
estimates for 2003 only; results for 1997 are broadly similar, and are available on request. In all 
cases, Likelihood Ratio tests unambiguously reject the null hypothesis that the coefficients in 
each regression (both reported and unreported) are jointly insignificant.  
Turning to the coefficient estimates presented, most findings are in accordance with 
expectations. Thus, the results show that both men and women with educational qualifications 
are significantly more likely to be in employment than those without any qualifications; a finding 
that applies for both categories of the disabled as well as the non-disabled. However, the 
marginal effect of each qualification is stronger for the work-limited disabled, indicating the 
particular importance of obtaining qualifications among this group.15 There are, in addition, 
strong age effects, with positive and negative signs on the linear and quadratic terms respectively 
observed in all cases, and conforming to the usual pattern. Married men, whether disabled or not, 
are more likely to be employed than single men, while the reverse applies to women, reflecting 
conventional household roles. In a similar vein, the presence of children generally has a negative 
effect on participation, although this effect is not significant for disabled men. The presence of 
an earned source of income by another household member has a positive effect on employment 
participation, as does possession of a mortgage, while habitation of social housing has the 
opposite effect. Outright home ownership reduces the likelihood of employment for non-disabled 
and non-work-limited men, but has no significant effect on work-limited disabled men. The 
income variable is especially noteworthy. In particular it should be noted that this is not the 
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 In terms of the highest qualification the marginal effect is 0.35 for work-limited disabled males and 0.09 for non-
disabled males. A full set of marginal effects is available from the authors on request.  
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conventional measure of unearned income for an individual, which would be expected to reduce 
labour supply (as found in Kidd et al. 2000). Given the sign of its parameter estimate in Tables 2 
and 3, it seems likely that our measure is instead capturing the polarisation of households as 
being either dual income or no income types (see for example Dickens et al. 2000, Table 4). 
For the disabled, having a number of health problems reduces the likelihood of 
employment.16 There are also significant regional effects, with lower employment participation 
rates in regions with slacker labour markets compared to the omitted region (the South-East and 
London). In contrast to non-disabled men, work-limited disabled men have a significantly lower 
participation rate in Yorkshire and Humberside and Scotland. In the case of women, regional 
differences between the non-disabled and disabled are more marked. In the North, North-West, 
Wales and Scotland, participation is significantly lower for the work-limited disabled, but 
significantly higher for the non-disabled. In other regions there are significant differences for 
either group, but not the other. On the whole, therefore, particular personal and other 
characteristics appear to have similar qualitative effects on the probability of employment for 
both the non-disabled and disabled, although there are some notable exceptions. However, while 
qualitatively similar, χ2 tests of parameter equality among the different comparator sub-groups 
unambiguously reject the null of homogeneity in each case.17 
 
4.2 Earnings 
In general, it seems to be the case also that earnings are determined in a qualitatively similar 
fashion for disabled and non-disabled persons (Tables 4 and 5), although F tests of parameter 
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 This result can only be obtained when the non-work-limited disabled are included with the non-disabled.  Results 
not reported here, but available from the authors on request. 
17
 For example, testing the pooling restriction for disabled and non-disabled males results in a χ2 test statistic of 
1802.91, while for females the corresponding figure is 1685.27; with 28 degrees of freedom, both are clearly 
significant. 
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equality are rejected in all cases, and more comprehensively so, when comparing men and 
women than in the case of disabled and non-disabled. 
In terms of specific coefficient estimates, these are once again largely in accordance with 
the usual predictions. Thus, wages are higher for those with qualifications relative to those 
without qualifications in each of the sub-group regressions, with the coefficients generally 
increasing in magnitude as one progresses up the qualifications hierarchy. Other human capital 
variables such as (maximum potential) experience and tenure with the current employer are 
always significant at better than the 1% level, and in all cases there is evidence of the 
conventional decreasing returns. So far as occupation is concerned, the occupational group 
dummies are generally significantly negative and of plausible relative magnitudes given the 
omitted category of managers and senior officials; the only notable exception is females in 
professional occupations, whose earnings are higher than the base group.  
Turning to other variables in these regressions, in conformity with a number of previous 
studies (see for example Blackaby et al. 1998), wages are higher for married men than for single 
men, irrespective of whether they are disabled, though this variable is insignificant for women 
and work-limited disabled men. Being employed in a small firm (fewer than 20 employees) is 
associated with lower earnings for all of our sub-groups. For the housing status variables, these 
are largely in accordance with priors: being in social housing is negatively related to earnings for 
all groups, while the reverse is true for those in possession of a mortgage, though not always 
significantly so. No clear relationship is evident for those who own their home outright, the sign 
being positive for men and work-limited disabled women and negative for non-disabled women. 
As might be expected a priori given the omitted category (London and the South East), 
all regional dummies exhibit negative coefficient signs in each of the four sub-group regressions. 
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These are significant with just one exception, namely work-limited disabled males in East 
Anglia. The industry dummies have a fairly consistent effect across the groups, with higher 
earnings in banking and finance, energy and water, construction, manufacturing, transport and 
communications. For males, being employed in agriculture and fishing has a significant negative 
effect for the non-disabled only and distribution and hotels a significant positive effect for the 
work-limited disabled only. Similarly, for females, being employed in public administration only 
affects the wage of the non-disabled group. Interestingly, being employed in the public sector 
confers a wage advantage for women and work-limited disabled men. Finally, the selectivity 
correction term (lambda) is only significant (with positive sign) for work-limited disabled 
women and (negatively) for non-disabled women. 
 
4.3 Employment participation, earnings and type of health problem 
In Tables 6 and 7 we repeat the preceding analysis, but focus on the disabled groups only, 
incorporating information for each individual concerning their main type of health problem.18 
Those with each of the broad types of included health problem/disability are significantly more 
likely to be in employment than the omitted category of mental health.19,20 The earnings 
equations also show that for men those with all types of disability earn significantly more than 
those with mental health problems, but for women only the skin, breathing and organs variable is 
significant, and then only for those whose disability is work-limiting. For men, this is in contrast 
to the earlier work of Kidd et al., where mental health was associated with a lower employment 
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 It seems plausible that this will be the health problem giving rise to the disability, and for this reason we use the 
two terms interchangeably in this section.  
19
 The marginal effect of the included health dummies being at least 0.09 for work-limited males and 0.11 for work-
limited females using 2003 data.   
20
 In separate regressions, the number of health problems is negatively and significantly related to being in 
employment for each of the disabled groups.  Since this variable is not defined for the non-disabled, this variable is 
excluded from the reported tables of results for consistency.  These results are however available on request. 
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probability only. Using the 2003 data suggests therefore, that of the various disability types, 
mental health is more problematical both for gaining entry into the labour market and in 
obtaining earnings comparable to those of other workers. This is an important finding, 
confirming as it does the findings of inter alia, Bunt et al. (2001) and Meager et al. (1998) 
concerning the especially acute nature of the labour market disadvantage suffered by those with 
problems of this type.  
The reasons for the acuity of the problem faced by those with mental health problems are 
difficult to determine, but two factors seem likely to be important. The first is that employers 
may, for various reasons, be more reluctant to hire those with mental health problems than with 
other forms of disability, and consequently when this group do find work, they do so at a lower 
wage.21 However, it should be noted that the discrimination may in many cases reflect not 
prejudice, but rather a lack of knowledge concerning, and misconceptions of, the nature of 
mental health problems and the consequences of, and limitations imposed thereby (Brook 2003). 
22
 The second is that employers may have a tendency to interpret disability in terms of 
‘physically obvious, or particularly severe, impairments’ (Aston et al. 2003: 5), and hence to 
focus on the physical adaptations to premises required under the DDA, rather than adjustments to 
working arrangements.23 This implies that employers may therefore, inadvertently, not be as 
accommodating to the needs of those with mental health problems. There is also evidence to 
suggest that they are less likely to make adaptations for new hires (Goldstone with Meager 
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 The differences in labour market outcomes between mental health and all other health problems can be 
decomposed into the effects of characteristics and coefficients. The proportion explained by differences in 
characteristics is only 19% for the participation probit but 75% for the wage gap (using Cotton, 1988 style weights); 
for employment therefore, coefficient differences represent much the greater part of the phenomenon.  Another 
reason employers may not hire people with mental disabilities is that they may have lower productivity in ways that 
are difficult to control for. 
22
 Article published in the Guardian G2 supplement, 3 June 2003. 
23
 Examples of working arrangement alterations include re-allocation of duties, changes to working hours, 
accommodating absence during working hours for treatment, etc. 
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2002);24 the high inactivity rates of those with mental health problems may therefore make this 
especially problematic for this group when they attempt to (re) join the labour market.  
 
4.4 Gender and disability decompositions 
A key feature of our analysis is to decompose the differences between the disabled and non-
disabled and also between genders. Thus we have two types of wage decomposition.25 The first, 
following DeLeire, compares each of the two types of disabled (work-limited and non-work-
limited) with the non-disabled separately for men and women, and of necessity excludes types of 
disability (Table 8). The gender decompositions in contrast, compare the earnings of men and 
women within each of the disability categories (work-limited disabled, non-work-limited 
disabled and non-disabled) to examine whether the earnings impact of disability varies by 
gender.   
 
4.4.1 Disability decompositions. For the first of the two decomposition types above, Table 8 
indicates that for both men and women, the percentage ‘explained’ typically constitutes 
somewhat less than half the differential between the non-disabled and the work-limited disabled 
in 1997 (panel (a)), and is lower for men than women, regardless of the basis of comparison, 
while the raw differential is larger. By 2003 however (panel (b)), the situation has largely been 
reversed, with the raw differential now being larger for women, and the ‘unexplained’ 
(discriminatory/residual) component for this group having increased to approximately three 
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 Survey evidence also suggests that employers who have sick/disabled employees do not fully recognise 
adjustments made to work arrangements unless prompted, or at least to recognise them as being specifically related 
to disability (Goldstone with Meager, 2002). 
25
 Decompositions of the employment probits indicate a low ‘explained’ component (20% for males, compared to 
around 50% in both Blackaby et al., 1999 and Kidd et al., 2000), and for this reason details are not documented here 
(results are available from the corresponding author on request, together with detailed wage decompositions).  To 
the extent that the ‘unexplained’ component is interpreted as reflecting discrimination, this suggests that in terms of 
employment at least, the situation for disabled persons may not have improved since the passing of the DDA. 
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quarters of the differential, in comparison with around half for men, again irrespective of the 
basis of comparison. Thus the relative position of work-limited disabled women compared to the 
non-disabled has clearly worsened over the period.  While the 2003 results contrast with 
Blackaby et al. (1999), whose findings are more akin to our 1997 results, they are consistent with 
discrimination being more substantial for disabled women than for disabled men, assuming the 
same impact from omitted types of disability variables.   
Considering the non-work-limited disabled (panels (c) and (d)), differentials are very 
small in both years. In the case of males, the offer wage for the disabled actually exceeds that of 
the non-disabled in 2003 (panel (d)), albeit the gap is tiny (0.003), and is wholly explained by 
characteristics.  For non-work-limited women, the raw differential is in favour of the non-
disabled and is bigger (0.035), of which 80% is unexplained in the pooled decomposition. In 
1997 the raw differential was larger and in favour of the non-disabled for men, suggesting that 
the position of this group of disabled workers has improved.  In contrast, there is little change 
between the two years for non-work-limited women, albeit the explained proportion has 
increased somewhat. These results therefore appear to indicate that the relative position of non-
work-limited disabled women, compared to the corresponding male disabled group has also 
deteriorated, even if, for non-work-limited disabled women their position relative to the non-
disabled has not. However, as Table 8 panels (c) and (d) indicate, for those whose disability is 
not work-limiting, endowments (measured productivity differences) contribute very little to these 
measured wage differentials.  The small ‘unexplained’ component, by assumption, captures 
discrimination.  On this basis, there is little therefore to suggest substantial discrimination against 
the disabled, at least where disability is not work-limiting in nature, and its absolute magnitude 
has fallen over time for both men and women. 
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4.4.2 Gender decompositions. Table 9 next presents gender wage decompositions to examine 
whether the disadvantage of disabled women relative to disabled men is greater or less than the 
disadvantage of non-disabled women to non-disabled men. In the US, Baldwin and Johnson 
(1995) report that while disabled women face a double penalty in the labour market from gender 
and disability, the gender gap is no larger for the disabled.  In our data, the raw earnings 
differential is larger for each of the two disabled groups in 2003 (panel (a)) compared with 1997 
(panel (b)), which confirms the worsening position of disabled women, and in particular those 
whose disability is work-limiting, relative to men. Particularly noteworthy is that the percentage 
‘unexplained’ is typically greatest for those whose disability is work-limiting, which is again 
consistent with a discrimination interpretation. When the type of health problem is controlled for 
in the gender decomposition (panels (c) and (d) of Table 9), the unexplained wage gap decreases 
marginally for the work-limited disabled, indicating a possible gender difference in the impact of 
types of disability on earnings. One possible reason why women may be at a disadvantage is that 
men are more likely to be injured at work and may be accommodated better by their employer.  
 
4.4.3 Time-wise decompositions. In order to examine the factors contributing to changes over 
time, we present time-wise decompositions using deflated wages for 2003 based on eq. (5) for 
each of our six sub-groups (Table 10).  As can be seen, very different patterns emerge for men 
and women, as might be expected given the preceding discussion. For men, the biggest gain in 
real terms occurred for the work-limited disabled and the lowest for the non-disabled. In contrast, 
for women, the improvement was greater for the non-work-limited disabled and the non-
disabled, both of whom have a very similar gain in real terms. For work-limited women the gain 
is, however, very modest (0.047), confirming the previous discussion. For men, the bulk of the 
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improvement is unexplained by variables in our model, and the percentage unexplained is 
slightly higher for the work-limited disabled. In the case of women, while only about a quarter of 
the improvement can be explained for the non-work-limited disabled and non-disabled, for the 
work-limited disabled the improvement is fully explained by variables in our model. This implies 
that legislation cannot have played any part in the wage gains of work-limited disabled women, 
but there is some scope for interpreting our results as indicating a positive impact on the earnings 
of work-limited disabled men. 
This is perhaps clearer if, following DeLeire (2000), we identify separately the 
contributions of observed and unobserved characteristics and discrimination.  As noted earlier, 
since the non-work limited disabled are assumed have no unobserved productivity difference, the 
entire unexplained component of the wage differential between the non-work limited and the 
non-disabled reflects discrimination. In contrast, for the work-limited disabled, the unexplained 
component captures both discrimination and unobserved (health) productivity differences. Using 
the two decompositions, it is possible to isolate these last two effects.  As Table 11, panel (a) 
indicates, for males, the differential has fallen over time.  This improvement is largely the 
consequence of decreases in the absolute sizes of the unobserved (health) and discriminatory 
components rather than observed characteristics, which might therefore be taken as evidence of 
the beneficial impact of the legislation for men, the former being consistent with disability 
having less impact on work.  For females in contrast (panel (b)), the differential has increased 
over time, primarily due to a large rise in the contribution of unobserved (health) effects.  While 
the absolute magnitude of the discrimination component has fallen marginally (and halved in 
relative terms), taken as a whole, the evidence does not support the view that the legislation has 
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significantly improved the relative earnings of the female work-limited disabled.  As such, it 
would appear that the legislation may have impacted in an unforeseen, gender-specific manner. 
 
4.4.4 Employment effects.26 The last aspect of our analysis is to examine the employment 
implications of the wage discrimination for both men and women. This is undertaken using the 
Baldwin and Johnson (1992) methodology, deployed in Kidd et al. (2000). Their procedure 
involves two steps. First, the coefficient estimates of the probit model are used to predict the 
probability of employment for average disabled and non-disabled individuals. Thus: 
  jujjj Y   ( , )j D A  (6) 
where j   the probability of employment for an average man or women,   = the cumulative 
density function and j
uj
j
Y  is the adjusted offer wage – reservation wage. Second, the average 
probability of employment in the absence of discrimination ( *j ) is estimated. A Heckman model 
of labour supply is estimated on the assumption that hours worked are proportional to the gap 
between the offer and reservation wages, which allows uj  to be estimated as a by-product of the 
hours of work equation. Labour market experience, which is included in the wage offer 
specification, is excluded from the reservation wage model in order to provide identification. On 
this basis the above equation is adjusted to become:  
 











Y    (7) 
                                                 
26
 Throughout this section, ‘discrimination’ refers to the entire unexplained wage gap consistent with previous 
literature. 
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where *OjW  is the non-discriminatory offer wage.  From this it is then possible to compare 
employment rates for the comparator groups in the presence and absence of discrimination. 
The results of this procedure are set out in Table 12 for 1997 and 2003. These are 
restricted to consideration of the work-limited disabled, for whom, given the more substantial 
nature of wage differentials, such effects are likely to be larger.  The top part of the table sets out 
the predicted employment participation probabilities for the disabled and non-disabled in the 
presence and absence of discrimination, with the non-discriminatory wage structure being a 
weighted average of the disabled and non-disabled returns for the gender group under 
consideration, with the weights being the proportions of each group in the relevant populations. 
Predictably, male employment participation rates are higher than for females, and for the non-
disabled compared to the disabled. As can be seen, the employment effects of changing to the 
alternative wage structure are in all cases small, particularly for the non-disabled, and in terms of 
elasticities, in several cases (all in the case of women), the sign is actually negative. The group 
with the largest positive employment elasticity is perhaps not surprisingly, disabled men, 
although even here it remains inelastic. As Kidd et al. (2000: 977-978) indicate: ‘This is 
important from a policy viewpoint – it suggests that wage discrimination per se may be 
important but the implied employment effect associated with the discriminatory wage reduction 
is very small’.  
 
5. Conclusions. 
In this paper, while recognising the difficulties in identifying the effect of disability on labour 
market outcomes, we attempt to assess the impact of the Disability Discrimination Act for the 
disabled and to compare the effect of disability by gender. The evidence suggests that substantial 
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differences in both likelihood of employment and levels of earnings remain, even after several 
years of operation of the Disability Discrimination Act. Significant heterogeneity within the 
disabled group is also identified, with the type of health problem having an important influence 
on employment and earnings. As with ethnicity, it becomes important to differentiate between 
the sub-groups to identify those who face the greatest labour market disadvantage. The evidence 
suggests that those suffering from mental health forms of disability fare particularly badly, and 
indicates that future efforts may need to be directed towards assisting this particular group. 
Although our data do not allow us to investigate the reasons for the particularly extreme degree 
of disadvantage faced by this group, part of the answer may reside in improving employers’ 
access to information concerning the various types of mental illness and their implications for 
work. It may also be helpful to emphasise the ‘reasonable adjustments’ that can be made for 
workers with this type of disability; the popular conception of such adjustments perhaps being 
more with physical environment. 
Distinguishing between work-limited and non work-limited disabled workers, following 
DeLeire (2000), we find discrimination, albeit a small percentage of the overall wage gap, has 
fallen for men over time in terms of our wage decompositions, but some discrimination remains 
in 2003 in the case of women.  One might conclude therefore, that the legislation, to the extent it 
has had an impact has been helpful in the case of men, but less so in the case of women, and in 
particular, for women whose disability is work-limiting.  Consistent evidence to this effect is 
provided by both gender and time-wise decompositions.  For men, the improvement in earnings 
over time is not due to changes in characteristics, which leaves room for a positive impact of the 
legislation.  For women in contrast, not only has the wage gap between the disabled and non-
disabled grown, but also any improvement in their position in the post-DDA period is the 
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consequence of changes in characteristics, leaving little scope for the role of legislation.  This 
suggests that the legislation may have impacted differentially by gender.  
Finally, in terms of the employment effects associated with discrimination in wages 
against the disabled, we find little evidence using the Baldwin and Johnson (1992) methodology 
that these are substantial, and indeed for women, such effects are somewhat perverse. However, 
there is a suggestion that the male (work-limited) disabled may be becoming less sensitive to 
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Table 1 . 
Summary statistics 






 1997 2003 1997 2003 1997 2003 
Log hour pay 1.822 2.109 2.013 2.280 2.001 2.275 
Quarter 2 0.247 0.246 0.243 0.260 0.251 0.246 
Quarter 3 0.256 0.250 0.263 0.240 0.248 0.250 
Quarter 4 0.256 0.247 0.273 0.250 0.246 0.246 
Region 1 0.080 0.079 0.065 0.058 0.055 0.056 
Region 2 0.106 0.100 0.087 0.103 0.089 0.098 
Region 3 0.070 0.075 0.081 0.077 0.071 0.074 
Region 4 0.032 0.033 0.045 0.039 0.040 0.034 
Region 6 0.070 0.080 0.081 0.091 0.082 0.086 
Region 7 0.090 0.093 0.101 0.090 0.098 0.097 
Region 8 0.133 0.122 0.096 0.105 0.104 0.095 
Region 9 0.074 0.069 0.048 0.047 0.047 0.047 
Region 10 0.115 0.102 0.092 0.091 0.099 0.096 
Occupation 2 0.083 0.110 0.119 0.131 0.116 0.144 
Occupation 3 0.086 0.118 0.089 0.133 0.093 0.142 
Occupation 4 0.090 0.064 0.074 0.054 0.076 0.052 
Occupation 5 0.181 0.168 0.179 0.154 0.171 0.154 
Occupation 6 0.085 0.034 0.072 0.026 0.072 0.022 
Occupation 7 0.045 0.040 0.054 0.038 0.055 0.046 
Occupation 8 0.187 0.154 0.159 0.144 0.147 0.122 
Occupation 9 0.107 0.173 0.065 0.123 0.075 0.120 
Industry 1 0.016 0.012 0.012 0.011 0.013 0.010 
Industry 2 0.016 0.020 0.015 0.024 0.020 0.019 
Industry 3 0.295 0.229 0.299 0.252 0.288 0.234 
Industry 4 0.075 0.072 0.082 0.080 0.080 0.087 
Industry 5 0.178 0.176 0.147 0.151 0.166 0.174 
Industry 6 0.085 0.109 0.088 0.102 0.093 0.099 
Industry 7 0.110 0.129 0.126 0.140 0.139 0.153 
Industry 8 0.180 0.196 0.184 0.192 0.159 0.182 
Days illness 0.579 0.200 0.180 0.081 0.122 0.057 
Married 0.619 0.561 0.642 0.643 0.563 0.519 
Experience 30.932 30.794 25.351 27.360 19.523 19.307 
Exp squared 1155.792 1142.767 853.355 953.120 566.815 564.113 
Age 46.840 47.088 42.213 44.589 36.802 37.030 
Age squared 2372.337 2391.270 1972.012 2171.053 1523.036 1547.304 
Qual 1 0.056 0.077 0.136 0.175 0.162 0.204 
Qual 2 0.048 0.057 0.081 0.095 0.084 0.084 
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Qual 3 0.277 0.263 0.314 0.324 0.297 0.288 
Qual 4 0.109 0.132 0.174 0.161 0.196 0.195 
Qual 5 0.169 0.161 0.157 0.131 0.140 0.124 
Small firm 0.261 0.264 0.218 0.235 0.231 0.236 
Part-time 0.123 0.128 0.068 0.073 0.068 0.079 
White 0.945 0.929 0.960 0.952 0.939 0.917 
Tenure 9.143 8.915 9.958 10.249 8.336 8.087 
Ten squared 177.992 173.531 197.238 209.812 147.036 142.740 
Public sector 0.218 0.205 0.223 0.216 0.198 0.199 
Activity 0.267 0.310 0.812 0.807 0.794 0.783 
Dependent children 0.465 0.442 0.545 0.504 0.647 0.616 
Hourly pay 7.468 9.704 8.971 11.512 8.861 11.653 
Overtime 4.179 3.633 4.934 4.305 4.828 4.092 
Social housing 0.349 0.331 0.140 0.109 0.135 0.108 
Home owned 0.226 0.248 0.181 0.233 0.137 0.163 
Home mortgaged 0.348 0.334 0.599 0.579 0.622 0.614 
Other earner 0.412 0.416 0.643 0.636 0.665 0.675 
Number of 
 health problems 2.760 2.678 1.430 1.424 0.000 0.000 
 






 1997 2003 1997 2003 1997 2003 
Log hour pay 1.588 1.913 1.707 2.014 1.720 2.033 
Quarter 2 0.250 0.256 0.262 0.249 0.251 0.250 
Quarter 3 0.257 0.259 0.262 0.245 0.248 0.246 
Quarter 4 0.254 0.241 0.259 0.255 0.247 0.246 
Region 1 0.071 0.073 0.061 0.058 0.056 0.057 
Region 2 0.097 0.100 0.097 0.106 0.089 0.097 
Region 3 0.065 0.075 0.077 0.074 0.071 0.073 
Region 4 0.034 0.031 0.041 0.032 0.038 0.035 
Region 6 0.069 0.082 0.089 0.092 0.082 0.085 
Region 7 0.099 0.102 0.089 0.086 0.095 0.092 
Region 8 0.130 0.110 0.093 0.099 0.105 0.100 
Region 9 0.074 0.068 0.049 0.047 0.050 0.048 
Region 10 0.110 0.099 0.083 0.094 0.099 0.096 
Occupation 2 0.079 0.081 0.095 0.101 0.097 0.117 
Occupation 3 0.089 0.131 0.114 0.137 0.113 0.147 
Occupation 4 0.242 0.212 0.255 0.246 0.263 0.230 
Occupation 5 0.029 0.019 0.024 0.019 0.022 0.016 
Occupation 6 0.162 0.146 0.168 0.131 0.159 0.129 
Occupation 7 0.126 0.137 0.109 0.122 0.120 0.123 
Occupation 8 0.058 0.037 0.051 0.026 0.041 0.024 
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Occupation 9 0.131 0.158 0.091 0.119 0.081 0.115 
Industry 1 0.007 0.003 0.006 0.003 0.006 0.003 
Industry 2 0.004 0.004 0.003 0.005 0.005 0.005 
Industry 3 0.120 0.077 0.117 0.073 0.117 0.082 
Industry 4 0.013 0.012 0.011 0.017 0.013 0.015 
Industry 5 0.241 0.240 0.213 0.208 0.232 0.221 
Industry 6 0.032 0.031 0.028 0.039 0.036 0.037 
Industry 7 0.125 0.122 0.141 0.141 0.145 0.146 
Industry 8 0.401 0.453 0.426 0.469 0.390 0.436 
Days illness 0.718 0.207 0.263 0.092 0.174 0.071 
Married 0.593 0.557 0.596 0.599 0.599 0.551 
Experience 27.362 27.279 22.666 24.039 18.903 18.911 
Exp squared 907.255 901.128 691.913 748.515 509.725 514.366 
Age 43.337 43.641 39.428 41.151 36.027 36.471 
Age squared 2017.056 2041.899 1713.105 1845.270 1434.132 1471.005 
Qual 1 0.041 0.068 0.091 0.130 0.114 0.162 
Qual 2 0.068 0.079 0.107 0.106 0.095 0.097 
Qual 3 0.109 0.128 0.140 0.174 0.160 0.184 
Qual 4 0.195 0.220 0.274 0.271 0.292 0.281 
Qual 5 0.168 0.158 0.172 0.154 0.153 0.133 
Small firm 0.356 0.319 0.299 0.295 0.308 0.289 
Part-time 0.503 0.518 0.399 0.409 0.440 0.432 
White 0.934 0.915 0.944 0.943 0.935 0.909 
Tenure 6.924 7.089 7.493 8.043 6.253 6.600 
Tenure squared 97.799 104.538 112.994 130.197 81.612 93.351 
Public sector 0.351 0.371 0.386 0.389 0.345 0.370 
Activity 0.274 0.312 0.724 0.709 0.679 0.685 
Dependent children 0.610 0.645 0.689 0.703 0.872 0.880 
Hourly pay 5.799 7.934 6.429 8.567 6.569 8.910 
Overtime 2.468 2.044 2.684 2.403 2.444 2.261 
Social housing 0.360 0.342 0.198 0.170 0.168 0.147 
Home owned 0.175 0.198 0.148 0.199 0.131 0.150 
Home mortgaged 0.391 0.377 0.562 0.545 0.598 0.595 
Other earner 0.506 0.510 0.681 0.682 0.725 0.722 
Notes:  In all cases figures relate to the estimation samples used. 
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Table 2.  







 Coefficient t-stat   Coefficient t-stat   Coefficient t-stat   
Constant -3.372 -16.56 *** -4.834 -18.82 *** -5.068 -51.73 *** 
Qual 1 0.946 14.09 *** 0.170 1.89 * 0.433 11.68 *** 
Qual 2 0.860 11.49 *** 0.013 0.13   0.452 9.58 *** 
Qual 3 0.587 12.32 *** 0.323 4.22 *** 0.437 13.19 *** 
Qual 4 0.620 10.96 *** 0.218 2.49 ** 0.481 13.66 *** 
Qual 5 0.421 7.77 *** 0.310 3.39 *** 0.434 11.27 *** 
Age 0.118 12.75 *** 0.252 20.62 *** 0.256 51.06 *** 
Age squared -0.002 -14.64 *** -0.003 -20.19 *** -0.003 -49.11 *** 
Married 0.212 4.83 *** 0.176 2.63 *** 0.201 7.02 *** 
Region 1 -0.278 -3.96 *** -0.267 -2.50 ** -0.131 -2.98 *** 
Region 2 -0.124 -2.00 ** 0.016 0.17   0.030 0.83   
Region 3 -0.095 -1.37   0.079 0.77   0.046 1.11   
Region 4 -0.107 -1.11   0.069 0.51   -0.020 -0.35   
Region 6 0.103 1.57   0.048 0.52   0.129 3.26 *** 
Region 7 -0.080 -1.25   -0.104 -1.16   0.114 3.08 *** 
Region 8 -0.230 -3.82 *** -0.260 -3.12 *** -0.081 -2.26 ** 
Region 9 -0.458 -5.99 *** -0.129 -1.11   -0.130 -2.72 *** 
Region 10 -0.219 -3.42 *** -0.120 -1.33   -0.007 -0.19   
White 0.388 5.52 *** 0.602 5.96 *** 0.578 17.36 *** 
Dependent children 0.017 0.84   -0.024 -0.67   -0.034 -2.53 ** 
Other earner 0.462 12.40 *** 0.500 9.44 *** 0.345 15.47 *** 
Social housing -0.509 -7.89 *** -0.323 -3.19 *** -0.349 -9.32 *** 
Home owned 0.028 0.43   -0.305 -3.23 *** -0.104 -2.88 *** 
Home mortgaged 0.360 5.81 *** 0.328 3.71 *** 0.383 12.46 *** 
No obs 7780 4834 27302 
Log likelihood -3685.03 -1761.43 -10410.35 
χ2 p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Pseudo-R2 0.235 0.258 0.270 
Notes: Regressions also include dummy variables for the quarter in which the individual was surveyed. ***, ** and * 
denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively. The χ2 statistic is a test that all slope 
coefficients are zero. Pseudo-R2 is McFadden’s measure, defined as 1 minus the ratio of the maximised 




Table 3.  







 Coefficient t-stat   Coefficient t-stat   Coefficient t-stat   
Constant -3.208 -14.80 *** -4.819 -18.86 *** -4.814 -50.61 *** 
Qual 1 1.030 15.27 *** 0.722 9.19 *** 0.720 23.41 *** 
Qual 2 0.960 15.33 *** 0.739 9.12 *** 0.842 23.91 *** 
Qual 3 0.763 14.1 *** 0.638 9.17 *** 0.544 19.24 *** 
Qual 4 0.664 14.02 *** 0.640 10.25 *** 0.561 21.72 *** 
Qual 5 0.538 10.38 *** 0.422 6.24 *** 0.402 13.69 *** 
Age 0.108 10.21 *** 0.227 17.26 *** 0.233 44.42 *** 
Age squared -0.001 -10.95 *** -0.003 -15.95 *** -0.003 -40.10 *** 
Married -0.113 -2.84 *** -0.235 -4.43 *** -0.235 -10.86 *** 
Region 1 -0.138 -1.98 ** -0.018 -0.20   0.093 2.56 ** 
Region 2 -0.075 -1.25   0.114 1.60   0.136 4.65 *** 
Region 3 -0.052 -0.77   -0.001 -0.01   0.179 5.43 *** 
Region 4 -0.176 -1.83 * 0.212 1.76 * 0.037 0.86   
Region 6 0.003 0.04   0.105 1.37   0.164 5.28 *** 
Region 7 -0.079 -1.31   0.073 0.96   0.135 4.55 *** 
Region 8 -0.217 -3.63 *** 0.138 1.88 * 0.081 2.80 *** 
Region 9 -0.261 -3.63 *** 0.055 0.55   0.123 3.15 *** 
Region 10 -0.225 -3.61 *** 0.023 0.31   0.178 5.92 *** 
White 0.498 7.32 *** 0.530 6.40 *** 0.515 18.49 *** 
Dependent children -0.164 -8.41 *** -0.370 -15.39 *** -0.377 -41.03 *** 
Other earner 0.425 11.14 *** 0.363 7.52 *** 0.292 14.55 *** 
Social housing -0.441 -6.92 *** -0.096 -1.20   -0.141 -4.52 *** 
Home owned 0.023 0.34   -0.077 -0.93   -0.032 -0.99   
Home mortgaged 0.319 5.24 *** 0.444 6.09 *** 0.405 15.36 *** 
No obs 7938 5309 33023 
Log likelihood -3983.83 -2635.48 -16575.36 
χ2 p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Pseudo-R2 0.192 0.177 0.194 




Table 4.  







 Coefficient t-stat   Coefficient t-stat   Coefficient t-stat   
Constant 1.833 14.55 *** 1.912 23.76 *** 1.879 51.58 *** 
Region 1 -0.163 -4.21 *** -0.151 -5.11 *** -0.207 -16.04 *** 
Region 2 -0.156 -4.81 *** -0.157 -6.94 *** -0.194 -19.30 *** 
Region 3 -0.096 -2.66 *** -0.144 -5.70 *** -0.187 -16.72 *** 
Region 4 0.024 0.49   -0.167 -5.00 *** -0.159 -10.16 *** 
Region 6 -0.087 -2.75 *** -0.109 -4.56 *** -0.163 -15.76 *** 
Region 7 -0.076 -2.27 ** -0.126 -5.22 *** -0.157 -15.56 *** 
Region 8 -0.110 -3.33 *** -0.123 -5.20 *** -0.187 -18.16 *** 
Region 9 -0.120 -2.58 *** -0.158 -4.92 *** -0.198 -14.19 *** 
Region 10 -0.073 -2.11 ** -0.138 -5.65 *** -0.177 -17.26 *** 
Occupation 2 0.001 0.02   -0.076 -3.16 *** -0.051 -5.05 *** 
Occupation 3 -0.173 -4.90 *** -0.159 -6.82 *** -0.154 -15.42 *** 
Occupation 4 -0.358 -8.25 *** -0.371 -11.71 *** -0.382 -27.46 *** 
Occupation 5 -0.375 -11.12 *** -0.379 -16.38 *** -0.392 -38.84 *** 
Occupation 6 -0.405 -7.24 *** -0.533 -11.99 *** -0.468 -22.97 *** 
Occupation 7 -0.526 -10.19 *** -0.463 -12.1 *** -0.437 -28.14 *** 
Occupation 8 -0.517 -14.91 *** -0.496 -20.32 *** -0.473 -42.46 *** 
Occupation 9 -0.582 -16.73 *** -0.579 -22.32 *** -0.526 -45.97 *** 
Industry 1 0.071 0.80   -0.168 -2.43 ** -0.053 -1.74 * 
Industry 2 0.320 4.42 *** 0.210 4.05 *** 0.197 8.14 *** 
Industry 3 0.225 5.19 *** 0.085 2.52 ** 0.098 6.40 *** 
Industry 4 0.280 5.58 *** 0.123 3.25 *** 0.157 9.33 *** 
Industry 5 0.148 3.38 *** -0.039 -1.13   -0.016 -1.06   
Industry 6 0.242 5.22 *** 0.106 2.93 *** 0.100 6.12 *** 
Industry 7 0.313 6.94 *** 0.182 5.23 *** 0.212 13.63 *** 
Industry 8 0.121 2.66 *** 0.032 0.93   0.070 4.36 *** 
Days illness -0.023 -2.38 ** -0.008 -0.64   -0.025 -4.02 *** 
Married 0.037 1.5   0.082 4.91 *** 0.070 10.11 *** 
Experience 0.017 5.02 *** 0.027 8.58 *** 0.032 22.93 *** 
Exp squared 0.000 -4.23 *** 0.000 -7.98 *** -0.001 -20.18 *** 
Qual 1 0.343 6.61 *** 0.374 12.11 *** 0.399 27.63 *** 
Qual 2 0.200 3.89 *** 0.166 5.20 *** 0.203 13.44 *** 
Qual 3 0.138 3.57 *** 0.094 3.68 *** 0.135 10.77 *** 
Qual 4 0.120 2.88 *** 0.039 1.42   0.066 5.10 *** 
Qual 5 0.103 2.70 *** 0.020 0.70   0.069 5.11 *** 
Small firm -0.120 -5.78 *** -0.113 -7.27 *** -0.144 -21.13 *** 
Part-time -0.144 -4.99 *** -0.057 -2.09 ** -0.049 -4.19 *** 
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White 0.016 0.36   0.034 0.96   0.073 5.60 *** 
Tenure 0.012 4.13 *** 0.011 5.53 *** 0.011 10.96 *** 
Ten squared 0.000 -1.87 * 0.000 -2.14 ** 0.000 -5.03 *** 
Public sector 0.062 1.84 * -0.006 -0.25   -0.019 -1.68 * 
Overtime  0.003 1.98 ** 0.006 5.60 *** 0.005 10.10 *** 
Social housing -0.088 -1.96 ** -0.034 -1.00   -0.074 -5.09 *** 
Home owned 0.042 1.16   0.052 1.74 * 0.017 1.43   
Home mortgaged 0.084 2.32 ** 0.090 3.46 *** 0.061 6.18 *** 
Lambda 0.010 0.18  0.041 0.74  0.029 1.16   
No obs 2409 3899 21389 
RSS 424.70 593.83 3377.51 
F (p-value) 0.000 0.000 0.000 
2R  0.447 0.545 0.54 
Notes:  Regressions also include dummy variables for the quarter in which the individual was surveyed. ***, ** and  
* denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively. RSS denotes the residual sum of squares. 
The F test is a test that all slope coefficients are zero. 
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 Coefficient t-stat   Coefficient t-stat   Coefficient t-stat   
Constant 1.464 12.59 *** 2.029 27.37 *** 2.007 68.85 *** 
Region 1 -0.174 -4.86 *** -0.140 -5.30 *** -0.164 -14.41 *** 
Region 2 -0.155 -5.33 *** -0.115 -5.65 *** -0.162 -17.60 *** 
Region 3 -0.150 -4.78 *** -0.125 -5.26 *** -0.152 -15.01 *** 
Region 4 -0.034 -0.72   -0.094 -2.88 *** -0.121 -8.67 *** 
Region 6 -0.122 -4.29 *** -0.094 -4.41 *** -0.140 -14.82 *** 
Region 7 -0.126 -4.29 *** -0.103 -4.65 *** -0.154 -16.40 *** 
Region 8 -0.146 -4.81 *** -0.123 -5.92 *** -0.135 -14.69 *** 
Region 9 -0.162 -4.23 *** -0.117 -4.09 *** -0.156 -12.75 *** 
Region 10 -0.162 -5.04 *** -0.106 -4.96 *** -0.139 -15.22 *** 
Occupation 2 0.073 1.75 * 0.094 3.35 *** 0.059 5.09 *** 
Occupation 3 -0.067 -1.84 * -0.072 -2.90 *** -0.117 -11.05 *** 
Occupation 4 -0.279 -8.27 *** -0.251 -11.02 *** -0.322 -32.32 *** 
Occupation 5 -0.343 -5.34 *** -0.426 -9.16 *** -0.489 -22.54 *** 
Occupation 6 -0.385 -10.41 *** -0.427 -16.02 *** -0.477 -40.80 *** 
Occupation 7 -0.365 -9.57 *** -0.350 -12.82 *** -0.458 -38.13 *** 
Occupation 8 -0.454 -8.23 *** -0.413 -9.27 *** -0.558 -28.66 *** 
Occupation 9 -0.460 -12.26 *** -0.469 -17.00 *** -0.539 -44.45 *** 
Industry 1 0.156 1.06   -0.041 -0.39   0.037 0.84   
Industry 2 0.117 0.93   0.256 3.07 *** 0.233 6.29 *** 
Industry 3 0.142 3.00 *** 0.072 1.96 ** 0.153 10.30 *** 
Industry 4 0.326 4.15 *** 0.114 2.21 ** 0.147 6.33 *** 
Industry 5 0.011 0.28   -0.097 -3.09 *** -0.010 -0.77   
Industry 6 0.180 3.30 *** 0.173 4.33 *** 0.170 10.10 *** 
Industry 7 0.206 5.10 *** 0.142 4.52 *** 0.204 15.82 *** 
Industry 8 0.054 1.46   0.013 0.46   0.047 3.92 *** 
Days illness -0.035 -3.93 *** -0.012 -1.18   -0.005 -1.03   
Married -0.004 -0.20   0.001 0.04   0.005 0.79   
Experience 0.018 6.47 *** 0.019 8.27 *** 0.018 20.19 *** 
Exp squared 0.000 -6.44 *** 0.000 -8.19 *** 0.000 -19.43 *** 
Qual 1 0.483 9.25 *** 0.338 10.83 *** 0.327 24.06 *** 
Qual 2 0.310 6.44 *** 0.210 7.20 *** 0.184 13.74 *** 
Qual 3 0.207 4.99 *** 0.047 1.83 * 0.094 8.23 *** 
Qual 4 0.171 4.62 *** 0.042 1.77 * 0.034 3.20 *** 
Qual 5 0.137 3.78 *** 0.017 0.73   0.030 2.65 *** 
Small firm -0.061 -3.41 *** -0.084 -6.33 *** -0.082 -14.09 *** 
Part-time -0.036 -2.05 ** -0.064 -4.77 *** -0.025 -4.29 *** 
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White 0.064 1.52   -0.093 -2.88 *** -0.007 -0.60   
Tenure 0.014 4.52 *** 0.012 5.68 *** 0.016 15.24 *** 
Ten squared 0.000 -1.07   0.000 -2.23 ** 0.000 -6.54 *** 
Public sector 0.103 4.32 *** 0.045 2.52 ** 0.047 5.93 *** 
Overtime  0.003 1.31   0.005 3.80 *** 0.005 7.75 *** 
Social housing -0.044 -1.08   -0.032 -1.16   -0.028 -2.31 ** 
Home owned 0.065 1.90 * 0.022 0.84   -0.004 -0.33   
Home mortgaged 0.110 3.45 *** 0.020 0.85   0.009 0.98   
lambda 0.156 3.00 *** -0.022 -0.57  -0.058 -3.83 *** 
No obs 2478 3764 22627 
RSS 357.13 453.52 3088.54 
F (p-value) 0.000 0.000 0.000 
2R  0.446 0.522 0.531 
Notes:  See notes to Table 4. 
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Table 6.  






disabled Work-limited disabled 
Non-work-limited 
disabled 
Coefficient t-stat  Coefficient t-stat  Coefficient t-stat  Coefficient t-stat  
Constant -3.857 -18.10 *** -5.237 -18.80 *** -3.775 -16.73 *** -5.231 -18.90 *** 
Qual 1 0.926 13.45 *** 0.152 1.69 * 1.018 14.85 *** 0.728 9.23 *** 
Qual 2 0.843 11.02 *** 0.003 0.03  0.936 14.71 *** 0.747 9.18 *** 
Qual 3 0.527 10.85 *** 0.308 4.01 *** 0.724 13.17 *** 0.653 9.34 *** 
Qual 4 0.561 9.69 *** 0.213 2.42 ** 0.634 13.16 *** 0.646 10.30 *** 
Qual 5 0.380 6.89 *** 0.314 3.40 *** 0.513 9.79 *** 0.431 6.35 *** 
Age 0.120 12.63 *** 0.251 20.50 *** 0.117 10.84 *** 0.230 17.30 *** 
Age squared -0.002 -14.92 *** -0.003 -20.10 *** -0.002 -11.85 *** -0.003 -16.10 *** 
Married 0.156 3.50 *** 0.170 2.53 ** -0.140 -3.46 *** -0.231 -4.34 *** 
Region 1 -0.320 -4.48 *** -0.285 -2.65 *** -0.147 -2.09 ** -0.020 -0.23  
Region 2 -0.139 -2.20 ** 0.014 0.15  -0.097 -1.60   0.116 1.62  
Region 3 -0.109 -1.55   0.075 0.73  -0.066 -0.98   0.002 0.02  
Region 4 -0.144 -1.47   0.059 0.44  -0.198 -2.03 ** 0.231 1.90 * 
Region 6 0.113 1.69 * 0.038 0.41  -0.001 -0.01   0.111 1.45  
Region 7 -0.098 -1.50   -0.105 -1.16  -0.101 -1.66 * 0.079 1.04  
Region 8 -0.240 -3.90 *** -0.253 -3.03 *** -0.241 -3.96 *** 0.139 1.89 * 
Region 9 -0.485 -6.21 *** -0.112 -0.95  -0.283 -3.89 *** 0.053 0.53  
Region 10 -0.221 -3.41 *** -0.124 -1.36  -0.230 -3.63 *** 0.024 0.31  
White 0.449 6.28 *** 0.610 6.02 *** 0.560 8.16 *** 0.540 6.48 *** 
Dependent children 0.003 0.15   -0.026 -0.71  -0.185 -9.30 *** -0.370 -15.40 *** 
Other earner 0.448 11.85 *** 0.489 9.19 *** 0.402 10.39 *** 0.350 7.22 *** 
Social housing -0.499 -7.56 *** -0.317 -3.11 *** -0.425 -6.56 *** -0.098 -1.22  
Home owned 0.050 0.75   -0.314 -3.31 *** 0.041 0.60   -0.082 -0.99  
Home mortgaged 0.362 5.72 *** 0.312 3.52 *** 0.331 5.35 *** 0.436 5.96 *** 
 42 
Health1 0.721 11.79 *** 0.500 3.89 *** 0.576 10.30 *** 0.391 3.61 *** 
Health2 0.792 8.05 *** 0.537 3.49 *** 0.660 6.76 *** 0.455 3.08 *** 
Health3 0.757 12.09 *** 0.472 3.98 *** 0.698 11.84 *** 0.401 3.99 *** 
Health5 0.263 3.60 *** 0.421 2.97 *** 0.312 4.87 *** 0.302 2.81 *** 
No obs 7725 4817 7892 5281 
Log likelihood -3547.12 -1747.96 -3880.13 -2612.75 
χ2 (p-value) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Pseudo-R2 0.259 0.261 0.209 0.180 
Notes: See notes to Table 2. 
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Table 7.  






disabled Work-limited disabled 
Non-work-limited 
disabled 
Coefficient t-stat  Coefficient t-stat  Coefficient t-stat  Coefficient t-stat  
Constant 1.724 11.78 *** 1.936 20.00 *** 1.405 10.79 *** 2.011 23.00 *** 
Region 1 -0.169 -4.26 *** -0.152 -5.13 *** -0.176 -4.91 *** -0.140 -5.31 *** 
Region 2 -0.159 -4.89 *** -0.158 -6.98 *** -0.160 -5.50 *** -0.116 -5.65 *** 
Region 3 -0.102 -2.83 *** -0.141 -5.58 *** -0.154 -4.91 *** -0.125 -5.25 *** 
Region 4 0.019 0.39   -0.167 -5.00 *** -0.038 -0.08   -0.092 -2.82 *** 
Region 6 -0.085 -2.70 *** -0.113 -4.77 *** -0.121 -4.24 *** -0.097 -4.55 *** 
Region 7 -0.078 -2.32 ** -0.125 -5.19 *** -0.131 -4.46 *** -0.103 -4.61 *** 
Region 8 -0.114 -3.43 *** -0.122 -5.19 *** -0.151 -4.97 *** -0.123 -5.88 *** 
Region 9 -0.124 -2.63 *** -0.157 -4.90 *** -0.167 -4.37 *** -0.116 -4.08 *** 
Region 10 -0.075 -2.18 ** -0.137 -5.61 *** -0.167 -5.19 *** -0.106 -4.96 *** 
Occupation 2 -0.002 -0.05   -0.079 -3.29 *** 0.066 1.59   0.094 3.36 *** 
Occupation 3 -0.170 -4.82 *** -0.158 -6.77 *** -0.064 -1.79 * -0.070 -2.84 *** 
Occupation 4 -0.359 -8.24 *** -0.370 -11.70 *** -0.276 -8.20 *** -0.251 -11.00 *** 
Occupation 5 -0.374 -11.05 *** -0.379 -16.40 *** -0.344 -5.36 *** -0.420 -8.99 *** 
Occupation 6 -0.405 -7.22 *** -0.534 -12.00 *** -0.384 -10.40 *** -0.427 -16.00 *** 
Occupation 7 -0.521 -10.07 *** -0.461 -12.1 *** -0.366 -9.60 *** -0.344 -12.6 *** 
Occupation 8 -0.517 -14.85 *** -0.496 -20.3 *** -0.452 -8.20 *** -0.410 -9.22 *** 
Occupation 9 -0.578 -16.57 *** -0.578 -22.3 *** -0.463 -12.32 *** -0.465 -16.90 *** 
Industry 1 0.078 0.88   -0.178 -2.56 ** 0.164 1.12   -0.038 -0.35  
Industry 2 0.322 4.45 *** 0.213 4.11 *** 0.108 0.86   0.245 2.94 *** 
Industry 3 0.224 5.17 *** 0.082 2.44 ** 0.139 2.94 *** 0.061 1.65 * 
Industry 4 0.283 5.64 *** 0.119 3.17 *** 0.325 4.15 *** 0.106 2.05 ** 
Industry 5 0.146 3.33 *** -0.041 -1.17  0.013 0.33   -0.110 -3.47 *** 
Industry 6 0.244 5.25 *** 0.102 2.83 *** 0.182 3.34 *** 0.158 3.92 *** 
 44 
Industry 7 0.315 6.98 *** 0.182 5.22 *** 0.206 5.11 *** 0.134 4.21 *** 
Industry 8 0.126 2.75 *** 0.028 0.83  0.053 1.44   0.006 0.21  
Days illness -0.022 -2.22 ** -0.007 -0.62  -0.035 -3.91 *** -0.012 -1.16  
Married 0.036 1.53   0.079 4.79 *** -0.008 -0.45   -0.002 -0.14  
Experience 0.017 5.08 *** 0.026 8.34 *** 0.018 6.61 *** 0.019 8.32 *** 
Exp squared 0.000 -4.31 *** 0.000 -7.72 *** 0.000 -6.55 *** 0.000 -8.22 *** 
Qual 1 0.343 6.74 *** 0.371 12.1 *** 0.485 9.50 *** 0.343 11.00 *** 
Qual 2 0.204 4.01 *** 0.168 5.26 *** 0.302 6.48 *** 0.213 7.27 *** 
Qual 3 0.141 3.78 *** 0.093 3.66 *** 0.201 5.02 *** 0.051 1.98 ** 
Qual 4 0.119 2.94 *** 0.038 1.38  0.167 4.67 *** 0.046 1.93 * 
Qual 5 0.107 2.84 *** 0.018 0.65  0.133 3.74 *** 0.025 1.04  
Small firm -0.122 -5.85 *** -0.116 -7.46 *** -0.062 -3.47 *** -0.085 -6.36 *** 
Part-time -0.141 -4.88 *** -0.065 -2.39 ** -0.035 -1.99 ** -0.067 -4.96 *** 
White 0.019 0.43   0.030 0.82  0.073 1.72 * -0.092 -2.83 *** 
Tenure 0.012 4.10 *** 0.012 5.63 *** 0.014 4.54 *** 0.013 5.80 *** 
Tenure squared 0.000 -1.84 * 0.000 -2.21 ** 0.000 -1.07   0.000 -2.30 ** 
Public sector 0.061 1.79 * -0.008 -0.31  0.105 4.40 *** 0.043 2.38 ** 
Overtime 0.003 1.93 * 0.006 5.67 *** 0.003 1.32   0.005 3.68 *** 
Social housing -0.090 -2.01 ** -0.032 -0.95  -0.041 -1.03   -0.033 -1.20  
Home owned 0.045 1.24   0.054 1.82 * 0.069 2.02 ** 0.021 0.79  
Home mortgaged 0.085 2.35 ** 0.088 3.42 *** 0.111 3.51 *** 0.022 0.94  
Health1 0.098 2.06 ** 0.000 -0.01  0.051 1.38   0.011 0.28  
Health2 0.156 2.62 *** -0.019 -0.36  0.052 0.98   -0.033 -0.71  
Health3 0.108 2.24 ** -0.003 -0.08  0.102 2.56 ** 0.021 0.59  
Health5 0.121 2.61 *** -0.011 -0.22  0.020 0.55   0.014 0.38  
Lambda 0.020 0.35   0.027 0.48  0.156 3.06 *** -0.015 -0.40  
No obs 2399 3886 2470 3741 
RSS 421.56 588.77 354.55 448.98 
F (p-value) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
2R  0.449 0.518 0.448 0.523 
Notes:  See notes to Table 4. 
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Table 8.  
Disabled and non-disabled wage decompositions 
 
(a) Work limiting disabled and non-disabled, 1997 
 Male Female 
Mean prediction non-disabled 1.994 1.739 
Mean prediction disabled 1.716 1.584 
Raw differential 0.278 0.155 
- due to endowments 0.117 0.076 
- due to coefficients 0.183 0.087 
- due to interaction -0.022 -0.008 : 0 1 0.5 0.928 * 0 1 0.5 0.93 * 
Unexplained 0.161 0.183 0.172 0.182 0.187 0.079 0.087 0.083 0.087 0.086 
Explained 0.117 0.095 0.106 0.096 0.092 0.076 0.068 0.072 0.069 0.069 
% unexplained 58.0 65.9 62.0 65.4 67.1 51.0 56.2 53.6 55.8 55.2 
% explained 42.0 34.1 38.0 34.6 32.9 49.0 43.8 46.4 44.2 44.8 
Differential due to selection variable -0.100 -0.023 
 
(b) Work limiting disabled and non-disabled, 2003 
 Male Female 
Mean prediction non-disabled 2.267 2.057 
Mean prediction disabled 2.101 1.771 
Raw differential 0.166 0.286 
- due to endowments 0.094 0.082 
- due to coefficients 0.086 0.216 
- due to interaction -0.013 -0.013 : 0 1 0.5 0.899 * 0 1 0.5 0.901 * 
Unexplained 0.072 0.086 0.079 0.084 0.089 0.203 0.216 0.21 0.215 0.216 
Explained 0.094 0.081 0.087 0.082 0.078 0.082 0.069 0.076 0.071 0.070 
% unexplained 43.5 51.4 47.5 50.6 53.4 71.1 75.7 73.4 75.3 75.6 
% explained 56.5 48.6 52.5 49.4 46.6 28.9 24.3 26.6 24.7 24.4 
Differential due to selection variable -0.001 -0.165 
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(c) Non-work-limited disabled and non-disabled, 1997 
 Male Female 
Mean prediction non-disabled 1.994 1.739 
Mean prediction disabled 1.946 1.703 
Raw differential 0.048 0.036 
- due to endowments -0.010 -0.001 
- due to coefficients 0.065 0.033 
- due to interaction -0.007 0.004 : 0 1 0.5 0.090 * 0 1 0.5 0.918 * 
Unexplained 0.058 0.065 0.061 0.059 0.059 0.037 0.033 0.035 0.033 0.033 
Explained -0.010 -0.017 -0.013 -0.011 -0.011 -0.001 0.003 0.001 0.003 0.003 
% unexplained 120.7 135.3 128.0 122.0 123.3 101.7 91.6 96.7 92.4 92.2 
% explained -20.7 -35.3 -28.0 -22.0 -23.3 -1.7 8.4 3.3 7.6 7.8 
Differential due to selection variable -0.061 -0.023 
 
(d) Non work limited disabled and non-disabled, 2003 
 Male Female 
Mean prediction non-disabled 2.267 2.057 
Mean prediction disabled 2.270 2.022 
Raw differential -0.003 0.035 
- due to endowments -0.015 0.005 
- due to coefficients 0.019 0.028 
- due to interaction -0.006 0.002 : 0 1 0.5 0.154 * 0 1 0.5 0.857 * 
Unexplained 0.013 0.019 0.016 0.014 0.014 0.03 0.028 0.029 0.028 0.028 
Explained -0.015 -0.021 -0.018 -0.016 -0.017 0.005 0.007 0.006 0.007 0.007 
% unexplained 449.9 668.4 559.1 483.6 491.7 86.1 79.5 82.8 80.4 80.0 
% explained -549.9 -768.4 -659.1 -583.6 -591.7 13.9 20.5 17.2 19.6 20.0 




Table 9.  




Work-limited disabled Non-work-limited disabled Non-disabled 
Mean prediction males 1.716 1.946 1.994 
Mean prediction females 1.584 1.703 1.739 
Raw differential 0.133 0.243 0.256 
- due to endowments 0.037 0.088 0.083 
- due to coefficients -0.040 0.114 0.109 
- due to interaction 0.136 0.042 0.063 : 0 1 0.5 0.503 * 0 1 0.5 0.521 * 0 1 0.5 0.496 * 
Unexplained 0.096 -0.040 0.028 0.027 -0.026 0.156 0.114 0.135 0.134 0.056 0.172 0.109 0.141 0.141 0.087 
Explained 0.037 0.173 0.105 0.105 0.159 0.088 0.130 0.109 0.110 0.188 0.083 0.147 0.115 0.115 0.168 
% unexplained 72.4 -30.5 20.9 20.6 -19.7 63.9 46.7 55.3 54.9 22.9 67.5 42.7 55.1 55.2 34.1 
% explained 27.6 130.5 79.1 79.4 119.7 36.1 53.3 44.7 45.1 77.1 32.5 57.3 44.9 44.8 65.9 




Work-limited disabled Non-work-limited disabled Non-disabled 
Mean prediction males 2.101 2.270 2.267 
Mean prediction females 1.771 2.022 2.057 
Raw differential 0.329 0.247 0.210 
- due to endowments 0.074 0.096 0.092 
- due to coefficients 0.194 0.097 0.084 
- due to interaction 0.061 0.054 0.033 : 0 1 0.5 0.493 * 0 1 0.5 0.509 * 0 1 0.5 0.486 * 
Unexplained 0.255 0.194 0.224 0.225 0.192 0.151 0.097 0.124 0.124 0.070 0.118 0.084 0.101 0.101 0.055 
Explained 0.074 0.136 0.105 0.105 0.137 0.096 0.151 0.123 0.124 0.178 0.092 0.126 0.109 0.109 0.155 
% unexplained 77.4 58.8 68.1 68.2 58.4 61.0 39.2 50.1 49.9 28.3 56.0 40.1 48.0 48.3 26.1 
% explained 22.6 41.2 31.9 31.8 41.6 39.0 60.8 49.9 50.1 71.7 44.0 59.9 52.0 51.7 73.9 
Differential due to selection variable -0.132 0.019 0.032 
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(c) 1997, including health problems 
 Work-limited disabled Non-work-limited disabled 
Mean prediction male 1.737 1.952 
Mean prediction female 1.573 1.703 
Raw differential 0.164 0.250 
- due to endowments  0.038 0.086 
- due to coefficients 0.004 0.118 
- due to interaction  0.122 0.046 : 0 1 0.5 0.503 * 0 1 0.5 0.522 * 
Unexplained 0.126 0.004 0.065 0.065 0.009 0.164 0.118 0.141 0.140 0.062 
Explained 0.038 0.160 0.099 0.099 0.155 0.086 0.131 0.109 0.110 0.188 
% unexplained 76.8 2.5 39.7 39.4 5.6 65.7 47.3 56.5 56.1 24.8 
% explained 23.2 97.5 60.3 60.6 94.4 34.3 52.7 43.5 43.9 75.2 
Differential due to selection variable 0.071 0.057 
 
(d) 2003, including health problems 
 Work-limited disabled Non-work-limited disabled 
Mean prediction male 2.093 2.273 
Mean prediction female 1.775 2.020 
Raw differential 0.318 0.253 
- due to endowments 0.078 0.097 
- due to coefficients 0.183 0.099 
- due to interaction 0.057 0.057 : 0 1 0.5 0.493 * 0 1 0.5 0.510 * 
Unexplained 0.240 0.183 0.212 0.212 0.180 0.156 0.099 0.128 0.127 0.074 
Explained 0.078 0.135 0.106 0.106 0.138 0.097 0.154 0.125 0.126 0.179 
% unexplained 75.6 57.6 66.6 66.7 56.6 61.8 39.1 50.5 50.2 29.4 
% explained 24.4 42.4 33.4 33.3 43.4 38.2 60.9 49.5 49.8 70.6 






Table 10.  




Work-limited disabled Non-work-limited disabled Non-disabled 
Mean prediction 2003 1.960 2.129 2.126 
Mean prediction 1997 1.716 1.946 1.994 
Raw differential 0.244 0.183 0.132 
- due to endowments 0.036 0.035 0.023 
- due to coefficients 0.209 0.146 0.100 
- due to interaction -0.001 0.002 0.009 : 0 1 0.5 0.517 * 0 1 0.5 0.576 * 0 1 0.5 0.423 * 
Unexplained 0.208 0.209 0.208 0.208 0.200 0.148 0.146 0.147 0.147 0.142 0.109 0.100 0.105 0.105 0.101 
Explained 0.036 0.035 0.035 0.035 0.044 0.035 0.037 0.036 0.036 0.041 0.023 0.032 0.027 0.027 0.031 
% unexplained 85.3 85.7 85.5 85.5 81.9 80.8 80 80.4 80.3 77.6 82.7 75.9 79.3 79.8 76.7 
% explained 14.7 14.3 14.5 14.5 18.1 19.2 20 19.6 19.7 22.4 17.3 24.1 20.7 20.2 23.3 




Work-limited disabled Non-work-limited disabled Non-disabled 
Mean prediction 2003 1.631 1.882 1.916 
Mean prediction 1997 1.584 1.703 1.739 
Raw differential 0.047 0.179 0.177 
- due to endowments 0.053 0.038 0.042 
- due to coefficients -0.009 0.143 0.140 
- due to interaction 0.003 -0.003 -0.004 : 0 1 0.5 0.527 * 0 1 0.5 0.588 * 0 1 0.5 0.434 * 
Unexplained -0.006 -0.009 -0.007 -0.008 -0.014 0.140 0.143 0.142 0.142 0.132 0.136 0.140 0.138 0.137 0.131 
Explained 0.053 0.056 0.055 0.055 0.061 0.038 0.036 0.037 0.037 0.047 0.042 0.038 0.040 0.040 0.046 
% unexplained -12.1 -19.4 -15.7 -15.9 -29.2 78.5 80.0 79.3 79.4 73.8 76.4 78.7 77.5 77.4 73.8 
% explained 112.1 119.4 115.7 115.9 129.2 21.5 20.0 20.7 20.6 26.2 23.6 21.3 22.5 22.6 26.2 
Differential due to selection variable 0.137 -0.013 0.160 
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Table 11.  





 1997 2003 
Predicted log earnings gap 0.278 0.166 
Difference in observable characteristics 0.092 (33%) 0.078 (47%) 
Difference in unobservable characteristics 0.128 (46%) 0.075 (45%) 
Discrimination 0.059 (21%) 0.014 (8%) 
 
(b) Females 
 1997 2003 
Predicted log earnings gap 0.155 0.286 
Difference in observable characteristics 0.069 (45%) 0.070 (24%) 
Difference in unobservable characteristics 0.053 (34%) 0.188 (66%) 




Employment effects of wage differences 
 
 Male Female 
1997 2003 1997 2003 
Employment probability 
- Non-disabled discriminatory 
- Non-disabled non-discriminatory 
- Disabled discriminatory 





































- Non-disabled discriminatory 
- Non-disabled non-discriminatory 
- Disabled discriminatory 






















Appendix 1. Variable definitions 
 
Dependent variables  
(Log) hourly wages Gross weekly earnings divided by usual hours worked per week 
Employment 
participation 
Dummy variable equal to 1 if individual has a positive hourly 
wage, 0 else 
  
Human capital variables  
Experience  Years of (potential) labour market experience (age minus 
school-leaving age) 
Tenure Years in present job 
Qual 1 Dummy variable, equals 1 if highest qualification is university 
degree or higher degree 
Qual 2 Dummy variable, equals 1 if highest qualification is other degree 
Qual 3 Dummy variable, equals 1 if highest qualification is A level 
Qual 4 Dummy variable, equals 1 if highest qualification is O level 
Qual 5 Dummy variable, equals 1 if highest qualification is other 
qualification 
Qual 6 Dummy variable, equals 1 if no qualifications (base) 
  
Industry variables  
Industry 1 Agriculture and fishing 
Industry 2 Energy and water 
Industry 3 Manufacturing 
Industry 4 Construction 
Industry 5 Distribution, hotels etc 
Industry 6 Transport communication etc 
Industry 7 Banking and finance 
Industry 8 Public administration  
Industry 9 and 10 Other (base) 
  
Occupation variables  
Occupation 1 Managers and senior officials (base) 
Occupation 2 Professional occupations 
Occupation 3 Associate professional and technical 
Occupation 4 Administrative and secretarial 
Occupation 5 Skilled trades 
Occupation 6 Personal service occupations 
Occupation 7 Sales and customer service occupations 
Occupation 8 Process, plant and machine operatives 
Occupation 9 Elementary occupations 
  
Region variables  
Region 1 North 
Region 2 Yorkshire and Humberside 
Region 3 East Midlands 
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Region 4 East Anglia 
Region 5 South East and London (base) 
Region 6 South West  
Region 7 West Midlands  
Region 8 North West  
Region 9 Wales  
Region 10 Scotland  
   
Health variables  
Days illness Number of days off sick in the reference week (0-7) 
No of health problems Number of health problems reported 
Health 1  Dummy variable, equals 1 if main health problem affects limbs  
Health 2  Dummy variable, equals 1 if main health problem affects 
sight/hearing 
Health 3 Dummy variable, equals 1 if main health problem affects skin, 
breathing and organs  
Health 4 Dummy variable, equals 1 if main health problem is mental 
health (base) 
Health 5 Dummy variable, equals 1 if main health problem is other 
  
Housing status variables  
Social housing Dummy variable, equals 1 if renting from non-private sector 
Home owned  Dummy variable, equals 1 if home owned outright 
Home mortgaged Dummy variable, equals 1 if home mortgaged 
Private rent Dummy variable, equals 1 if renting from private sector (base) 
  
Other variables  
Age Age (years) 
Married Dummy variable denoting marital status, equals 1 if married 
Dependent children Number of dependent children in household if head of 
household or spouse (0 else) 
Other earner Dummy variable, equals 1if there is another individual in 
household has a labour market income 
White Dummy variable denoting ethnic group, equals 1 if white 
Small firm  Dummy variable denoting firm size in which employed, equals 1 
if less than 20 employees in firm 
Public Dummy variable, equals 1 if individual is employed in the 
public sector 
Part-time  Dummy variable, equals 1 if employed part time 
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1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Male non-disabled Male non work limiting disabled
Male work limiting disabled Female non-disabled
Female non-work limiting disabled Female work limiting disabled
 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on UK LFS, Summer quarter. 
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1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Male non-disabled Male non-work limiting disabled
Male work limiting disabled Female non-disabled
Female non-work limiting disabled Female work limiting disabled
 
 
   Source: Authors’ calculations based on UK LFS, Summer quarter. 
 
